Executive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing

Chen, Yangyang

Executive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing / Yangyang Chen, Ferdinand A. Gul, Madhu Veeraraghavan & Leon Zolotoy . -- Páginas 2205 a la 2234

Reseña : Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risktaking incentives in the fees they charge for their services..


Contabilidad--Publicaciones seriadas
Auditoría--Estados Unidos--(2002 - 2010)--Publicaciones seriadas
Empresas--Estados Unidos--(2002 - 2010)--Publicaciones seriadas
Directores de empresas--Sobresueldos--Estados Unidos--(2002 - 2010)--Publicaciones seriadas
Riesgo (Finanzas)--Estados Unidos--(2002 - 2010)--Publicaciones seriadas

Gul, Ferdinand A. ; Veeraraghavan, Madhu ; Zolotoy, Leon ;
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Con tecnología Koha