Cost of capital free-riders Stephen P. Baginski, Lisa A. Hinson

Por: Colaborador(es): Tipo de material: ArtículoArtículoDescripción: Páginas 1291 a la 1313Tema(s): En: The accounting review 2016 V.91 No.5 (Sep)Revisión: We document the interrelationship of disclosure policy decisions by providing evidence that the cessation of quarterly management forecast guidance by 656 firms (“stoppers”) during 2004-2009 is associated with a pursuant increase in quarterly forecasts by previously non-forecasting firms in the same industries (“free-riders”). Increased forecasting by free-riders is positively associated with the information loss in the industry (proxied by the number of stoppers in the industry, the strength of previously-existing information transfer relations between the stopper and free-rider, and whether the stopper and free-rider are peer firms) and the importance of the information loss to the free-rider (proxied by analyst following and the existence of new share issues). Following the cessation event, free-rider cost of capital decreases as a function of the extent to which free-riders immediately initiate quarterly forecasting.
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Revistas Central Bogotá Sala Hemeroteca Colección Hemeroteca 657 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) 2016 V.91 No.5 (Sep) 1 Disponible 0000002030609

We document the interrelationship of disclosure policy decisions by providing evidence that the cessation of quarterly management forecast guidance by 656 firms (“stoppers”) during 2004-2009 is associated with a pursuant increase in quarterly forecasts by previously non-forecasting firms in the same industries (“free-riders”). Increased forecasting by free-riders is positively associated with the information loss in the industry (proxied by the number of stoppers in the industry, the strength of previously-existing information transfer relations between the stopper and free-rider, and whether the stopper and free-rider are peer firms) and the importance of the information loss to the free-rider (proxied by analyst following and the existence of new share issues). Following the cessation event, free-rider cost of capital decreases as a function of the extent to which free-riders immediately initiate quarterly forecasting.

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