Cost of capital free-riders Stephen P. Baginski, Lisa A. Hinson
Tipo de material: ArtículoDescripción: Páginas 1291 a la 1313Tema(s): En: The accounting review 2016 V.91 No.5 (Sep)Revisión: We document the interrelationship of disclosure policy decisions by providing evidence that the cessation of quarterly management forecast guidance by 656 firms (“stoppers”) during 2004-2009 is associated with a pursuant increase in quarterly forecasts by previously non-forecasting firms in the same industries (“free-riders”). Increased forecasting by free-riders is positively associated with the information loss in the industry (proxied by the number of stoppers in the industry, the strength of previously-existing information transfer relations between the stopper and free-rider, and whether the stopper and free-rider are peer firms) and the importance of the information loss to the free-rider (proxied by analyst following and the existence of new share issues). Following the cessation event, free-rider cost of capital decreases as a function of the extent to which free-riders immediately initiate quarterly forecasting.Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura topográfica | Info Vol | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
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Revistas | Central Bogotá Sala Hemeroteca | Colección Hemeroteca | 657 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | 2016 V.91 No.5 (Sep) | 1 | Disponible | 0000002030609 |
We document the interrelationship of disclosure policy decisions by providing evidence that the cessation of quarterly management forecast guidance by 656 firms (“stoppers”) during 2004-2009 is associated with a pursuant increase in quarterly forecasts by previously non-forecasting firms in the same industries (“free-riders”). Increased forecasting by free-riders is positively associated with the information loss in the industry (proxied by the number of stoppers in the industry, the strength of previously-existing information transfer relations between the stopper and free-rider, and whether the stopper and free-rider are peer firms) and the importance of the information loss to the free-rider (proxied by analyst following and the existence of new share issues). Following the cessation event, free-rider cost of capital decreases as a function of the extent to which free-riders immediately initiate quarterly forecasting.