Proxies and databases in financial misconduct research Jonathan M. Karpoff, Allison Koester, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin
Tipo de material:
ArtículoDescripción: Páginas 129 a la 163Tema(s): - Contabilidad -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Finanzas corporativas -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Gobierno corporativo -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Finanzas -- Legislación o Reglas de seguridad -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Fraude -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (SCAC)
- Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC)
| Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura topográfica | Info Vol | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revistas | Central Bogotá Sala Hemeroteca | Colección Hemeroteca | 657 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | 2017 V.92 No.6 (Nov) | 1 | Disponible | 0000002032280 |
An extensive literature examines the causes and effects of financial misconduct based on samples drawn from four popular databases that identify restatements, securities class action lawsuits, and Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs). We show that the results from empirical tests can depend on which database is accessed. To examine the causes of such discrepancies, we compare the information in each database to a detailed sample of 1,243 case histories in which regulators brought enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation. These comparisons allow us to identify, measure, and estimate the economic importance of four features of each database that affect inferences from empirical tests. We show the extent to which each database is subject to these concerns and offer suggestions for researchers using these databases.