000			01872nab a2200253 a 4500
999			_c199688 _d199688
003			OSt
005			20200226102056.0
008			200131s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aChen, Yangyang _9178580
245	1	0	_aExecutive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing _cYangyang Chen, Ferdinand A. Gul, Madhu Veeraraghavan & Leon Zolotoy
300			_aPáginas 2205 a la 2234
520	3		_aUsing a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risktaking incentives in the fees they charge for their services.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aAuditoría _y(2002 - 2010) _zEstados Unidos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178581
650	2	4	_aEmpresas _y(2002 - 2010) _zEstados Unidos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178582
650	2	4	_aDirectores de empresas _xSobresueldos _y(2002 - 2010) _zEstados Unidos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178583
650	2	4	_aRiesgo (Finanzas) _y(2002 - 2010) _zEstados Unidos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178584
700	1		_aGul, Ferdinand A. _9178585
700	1		_aVeeraraghavan, Madhu _9178586
700	1		_aZolotoy, Leon _9178302
773	0		_082265 _9370852 _aThe accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 6 (Nov) _o0000002031098 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h30 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART