China's closed pyramidal managerial labor market and the stock price crash risk
Chen, Donghua
China's closed pyramidal managerial labor market and the stock price crash risk / Donghua Chen, Jeong-Bon Kim, Oliver Zhen Li & Shangkun Liang . -- Páginas 105 a la 131
Reseña : Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk..
Contabilidad--Publicaciones seriadas
Compañías--Finanzas--China--Publicaciones seriadas
Mercado laboral--China--Publicaciones seriadas
Acciones (Bolsa)--Precios--China
Kim, Jeong-Bon ; Zhen Li, Oliver ; Liang, Shangkun ;
China's closed pyramidal managerial labor market and the stock price crash risk / Donghua Chen, Jeong-Bon Kim, Oliver Zhen Li & Shangkun Liang . -- Páginas 105 a la 131
Reseña : Managers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk..
Contabilidad--Publicaciones seriadas
Compañías--Finanzas--China--Publicaciones seriadas
Mercado laboral--China--Publicaciones seriadas
Acciones (Bolsa)--Precios--China
Kim, Jeong-Bon ; Zhen Li, Oliver ; Liang, Shangkun ;