Do auditors recognize the potential dark side of executives´ accounting competence? (Registro nro. 199126)
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| Campo fijo de descripción fija | 02058nab a2200217 a 4500 |
| 003 - IDENTIFICADOR DEL NÚMERO DE CONTROL | |
| Campo de control | OSt |
| 005 - FECHA Y HORA DE LA ULTIMA TRANSACCIÓN | |
| control field | 20200226101944.0 |
| 008 - ELEMENTOS DE LONGITUD FIJA -- INFORMACIÓN GENERAL | |
| Campo fijo de descripción fija -- Información general | 191202s2018 xxu n|||r|||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 040 ## - FUENTE DE CATALOGACIÓN | |
| Agencia Catalogadora | CO-BoUGC |
| Agencia que realiza la transcripción | CO-BoUGC |
| 100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL | |
| Nombre personal | Albrecht, Anne |
| 245 10 - TÍTULO | |
| Título | Do auditors recognize the potential dark side of executives´ accounting competence? |
| Responsables | Anne Albrecht, Elaine G. Mauldin & Nathan J. Newton |
| 300 ## - DESCRIPCIÓN FÍSICA | |
| Extensión | Páginas 1 a la 28 |
| 520 1# - NOTA DE RESUMEN, ETC. | |
| Nota de sumario, etc. | Practice and research recognize the importance of extensive knowledge of accounting and financial reporting experience for generating reliable financial statements. However, we consider the possibility that such knowledge and experience increase the likelihood of material misstatement when executives have incentives to misreport. We use executives' prior experience as an audit manager or partner as a measure of extensive accounting and financial reporting competence. We find that the interaction of this measure and compensation-based incentives increases the likelihood of misstatements. Further, auditors discount the audit fee premium associated with compensation-based incentives when executives have accounting competence. Together, our results suggest that a dark side of accounting competence emerges in the presence of certain incentives, but auditors view accounting competence favorably despite the heightened risk. In further analyses, we demonstrate that executives' aggressive attitude toward reporting exacerbates the effect of accounting competence and compensation-based incentives on misstatements, but not on audit fees. |
| 650 20 - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO DE MATERIA - TERMINO TEMÁTICO | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 56368 |
| Término temático o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Contabilidad |
| Subdivisión de forma | Publicaciones seriadas |
| 650 10 - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO DE MATERIA - TERMINO TEMÁTICO | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 57207 |
| Término temático o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Auditoría |
| Subdivisión de forma | Publicaciones seriadas |
| 650 20 - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO DE MATERIA - TERMINO TEMÁTICO | |
| Término temático o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Auditores |
| Subdivisión general | Honorarios |
| Subdivisión de forma | Publicaciones seriadas |
| 9 (RLIN) | 176282 |
| 700 1# - ENTR. SECUNDARIA - Nombre Personal (R) | |
| Nombre personal | Mauldin, Elaine G. |
| -- | 176283 |
| 700 1# - ENTR. SECUNDARIA - Nombre Personal (R) | |
| Nombre personal | Newton, Nathan J. |
| -- | 176284 |
| 773 0# - ASIENTO DE ITEM FUENTE | |
| Host Biblionumber | 82265 |
| Host Itemnumber | 380262 |
| Asiento principal | The accounting review 2018 V.93 No.6 (Nov) |
| Otro identificador del ítem | 0000002032749 |
| International Standard Serial Number | 0001-4826 (papel) |
| Descripción física | 28 páginas |
| Nota | Incluye tablas, apéndices y referencias bibliográficas |
| 942 ## - TIPO DE MATERIAL (KOHA) | |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme | Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Tipo de Item KOHA | Artículo de Revista |
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