Why does restatements decrease in a clawback environment? (Registro nro. 199700)
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| 005 - FECHA Y HORA DE LA ULTIMA TRANSACCIÓN | |
| control field | 20200226102058.0 |
| 008 - ELEMENTOS DE LONGITUD FIJA -- INFORMACIÓN GENERAL | |
| Campo fijo de descripción fija -- Información general | 200203s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d |
| 040 ## - FUENTE DE CATALOGACIÓN | |
| Agencia Catalogadora | CO-BoUGC |
| Agencia que realiza la transcripción | CO-BoUGC |
| 100 1# - ASIENTO PRINCIPAL--NOMBRE PERSONAL | |
| Nombre personal | Pyzoha, Jonathan |
| 245 10 - TÍTULO | |
| Título | Why does restatements decrease in a clawback environment? |
| Subtitulo | An investigation into financial reporting executives' decision-making during the restatement process |
| Responsables | Jonathan S. Pyzoha |
| 300 ## - DESCRIPCIÓN FÍSICA | |
| Extensión | Páginas 2515 a la 2536 |
| 520 3# - NOTA DE RESUMEN, ETC. | |
| Nota de sumario, etc. | Prior archival studies find that firms that voluntarily adopted clawback policies have experienced a reduction in restatements. I experimentally examine this outcome by investigating the influence of two key factors (i.e., executive compensation structure and auditor quality) on financial reporting executives' (hereafter, “executives”) decision-making regarding a proposed restatement that will lead to a clawback of their incentives. I find that executives (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) facing a lower quality auditor are less likely to agree with amending prior financial statements when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based. However, this tendency is reduced when executives face a higher quality auditor, indicating that higher quality auditors can act as effective monitors. My results identify an ex post unintended consequence of clawback regulation that could at least partially offset the benefits of the ex ante deterrent effects of clawbacks, and that could contribute to findings of less frequent restatements when clawback policies are in place. I discuss potential implications regarding the role of executives during restatement decisions and auditors' risk assessments in a clawback environment. |
| 650 14 - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO DE MATERIA - TERMINO TEMÁTICO | |
| 9 (RLIN) | 91036 |
| Término temático o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Contabilidad |
| Subdivisión de forma | Publicaciones seriadas |
| 650 24 - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO DE MATERIA - TERMINO TEMÁTICO | |
| Término temático o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Empresas |
| Subdivisión general | Contratos y especificaciones |
| Subdivisión de forma | Publicaciones seriadas |
| Subdivisión geográfica | Estados Unidos |
| 9 (RLIN) | 178701 |
| 650 24 - ASIENTO SECUNDARIO DE MATERIA - TERMINO TEMÁTICO | |
| Término temático o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Ejecutivos |
| Subdivisión general | Toma de decisiones |
| Subdivisión de forma | Publicaciones seriadas |
| 9 (RLIN) | 178702 |
| 690 ## - CAMPO LOCAL DE ACCESO TEMÁTICO | |
| Término temático o nombre geográfico como elemento de entrada | Dodd-Frank Act |
| 773 0# - ASIENTO DE ITEM FUENTE | |
| Host Biblionumber | 82265 |
| Host Itemnumber | 370852 |
| Asiento principal | The accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 6 (Nov) |
| Otro identificador del ítem | 0000002031098 |
| International Standard Serial Number | 0001-4826 (papel) |
| Descripción física | 22 páginas |
| Nota | Incluye tablas, figuras y referencias bibliográficas |
| 942 ## - TIPO DE MATERIAL (KOHA) | |
| Source of classification or shelving scheme | Dewey Decimal Classification |
| Tipo de Item KOHA | Artículo de Revista |
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