Do firms strategically disseminate? evidence from corporate use of social media Michael J. Jung, James P. Naughton, Ahmed Tahoun & Clare Wang
Tipo de material: ArtículoDescripción: Páginas 225 a la 252Tema(s):- Contabilidad -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Información financiera -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Empresas y medios de comunicación de masas -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Finanzas corporativas -- Legislación -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Administración de empresas -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Negocios -- Publicaciones seriadas
Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura topográfica | Info Vol | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Revistas | Central Bogotá Sala Hemeroteca | Colección Hemeroteca | 657 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | 2018 V.93 No.4 (Jul) | 1 | Disponible | 0000002033259 |
We examine whether firms use social media to strategically disseminate financial information. Analyzing S&P 1500 firms' use of Twitter to disseminate quarterly earnings announcements, we find that firms are less likely to disseminate when the news is bad and when the magnitude of the bad news is worse, consistent with strategic behavior. Furthermore, firms tend to send fewer earnings announcement tweets and “rehash” tweets when the news is bad. Cross-sectional analyses suggest that incentives for strategic dissemination are higher for firms with a lower level of investor sophistication and firms with a larger social media audience. We also find that strategic dissemination behavior is detectable in high litigation risk firms, but not low litigation risk firms. Finally, we find that the tweeting of bad news and the subsequent retweeting of that news by a firm's followers are associated with more negative news articles written about the firm by the traditional media, highlighting a potential downside to Twitter dissemination.