The effects of regulatory scrutiny on tax avoidance an examination of SEC comment letters Thomas R. Kubick, Daniel P. Lynch, Michael A. Mayberry & Thomas C. Omer
Tipo de material:
ArtículoDescripción: Páginas 1751 a la 1780Tema(s):
En: The accounting review 2016 V.91 No.6 (Nov)Incluye figuras, tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndicesResumen: This study examines the tax avoidance behavior of firms prior to the issuance, and following the resolution, of SEC tax comment letters. We find that firms that appear to engage in greater tax avoidance are more likely to receive a tax-related SEC comment letter. We also find that firms receiving a tax-related SEC comment letter, relative to firms receiving a non-tax comment letter, subsequently decrease their tax avoidance behavior consistent with an increase in expected tax costs. Additionally, we document evidence consistent with other firms that do not receive a comment letter reacting to multiple publicly disclosed tax-related comment letters within their industry by increasing their reported GAAP ETR, consistent with an indirect effect of regulatory scrutiny on certain types of tax avoidance.
| Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura topográfica | Info Vol | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revistas | Central Bogotá Sala Hemeroteca | Colección Hemeroteca | 657 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | 2016 V.91 No.6 (Nov) | 1 | Disponible | 0000002032091 |
This study examines the tax avoidance behavior of firms prior to the issuance, and following the resolution, of SEC tax comment letters. We find that firms that appear to engage in greater tax avoidance are more likely to receive a tax-related SEC comment letter. We also find that firms receiving a tax-related SEC comment letter, relative to firms receiving a non-tax comment letter, subsequently decrease their tax avoidance behavior consistent with an increase in expected tax costs. Additionally, we document evidence consistent with other firms that do not receive a comment letter reacting to multiple publicly disclosed tax-related comment letters within their industry by increasing their reported GAAP ETR, consistent with an indirect effect of regulatory scrutiny on certain types of tax avoidance.