Strategic disclosures of litigation loss contingencies when customer-supplier relationships are at risk Ling Cen, Feng Chen, Yu Hou & Gordon D. Richardson
Tipo de material: TextoDescripción: Páginas 137 a la 159Tema(s): En: The accounting review 2018 V.93 No.2 (Mar)Incluye tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndicesResumen: In the presence of litigation facing suppliers, the supply-chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply-chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura topográfica | Info Vol | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
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Revistas | Central Bogotá Sala Hemeroteca | Colección Hemeroteca | 657 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | 2018 V.93 No.2 (Mar) | 1 | Disponible | 0000002033447 |
In the presence of litigation facing suppliers, the supply-chain relationship is at risk. Suppliers with principal customers (dependent suppliers) have a higher concentration of sales to customers, and they are more at risk relative to suppliers without principal customers (non-dependent suppliers). As a result, we predict and find that litigation disclosure patterns differ for the two supplier types: dependent suppliers are more likely to delay bad news and accelerate good news related to litigation outcomes, compared to non-dependent suppliers. Such strategic disclosure patterns in our end-game setting are opposite to those documented in the existing supply-chain literature for the repeated-game setting (for example, Hui, Klasa, and Yeung 2012).