000			02058nab a2200217 a 4500
999			_c199126 _d199126
003			OSt
005			20200226101944.0
008			191202s2018 xxu n|||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aAlbrecht, Anne _9176281
245	1	0	_aDo auditors recognize the potential dark side of executives´ accounting competence? _cAnne Albrecht, Elaine G. Mauldin & Nathan J. Newton
300			_aPáginas 1 a la 28
520	1		_aPractice and research recognize the importance of extensive knowledge of accounting and financial reporting experience for generating reliable financial statements. However, we consider the possibility that such knowledge and experience increase the likelihood of material misstatement when executives have incentives to misreport. We use executives' prior experience as an audit manager or partner as a measure of extensive accounting and financial reporting competence. We find that the interaction of this measure and compensation-based incentives increases the likelihood of misstatements. Further, auditors discount the audit fee premium associated with compensation-based incentives when executives have accounting competence. Together, our results suggest that a dark side of accounting competence emerges in the presence of certain incentives, but auditors view accounting competence favorably despite the heightened risk. In further analyses, we demonstrate that executives' aggressive attitude toward reporting exacerbates the effect of accounting competence and compensation-based incentives on misstatements, but not on audit fees.
650	2	0	_956368 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	1	0	_957207 _aAuditoría _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	0	_aAuditores _xHonorarios _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176282
700	1		_aMauldin, Elaine G. _9176283
700	1		_aNewton, Nathan J. _9176284
773	0		_082265 _9380262 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.6 (Nov) _o0000002032749 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h28 páginas _nIncluye tablas, apéndices y referencias bibliográficas
942			_2ddc _cART