000			01987nam a2200217 4500
999			_c199140 _d199140
003			OSt
005			20200226101946.0
008			191202s20182015xxubr|||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aSaavedra, Daniel _9176350
245	1	0	_aSyndicate size and the choice of covenants in debt contracts _cDaniel Saavedra
300			_aPáginas 301 a la 329
520	3		_aI investigate whether and how syndicate size influences the type of covenants used in debt contracts. Prior theory and evidence suggest renegotiation considerations from coordination difficulties in large syndicates and intertemporal transfers due to relationship lending in small syndicates are factors in the design of covenants. I find that for large syndicates, borrowers and lenders avoid the use of flexibility-reducing covenants that are more likely to impact negatively on value-enhancing corporate policies in good states of the world. This effect becomes stronger when the borrower has fewer outside financing options. Additionally, I find contracts with large syndicates are more likely to have more covenant slack, include performance pricing provisions, have tailored capital expenditure covenants, and principally rely on covenants that are directly linked to the current performance of the borrower. Collectively, these results imply that syndicate size and related renegotiation considerations affect how accounting information is used in debt contracts.
650	1	4	_956368 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_993166 _aRiesgo financiero _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aInstituciones financieras _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176351
650	2	4	_aRelaciones industriales _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176352
650	2	4	_aSindicatos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176353
773	0		_082265 _9380262 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.6 (Nov) _o0000002032749 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h28 páginas _nIncluye tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART