000			01880nab a2200217 a 4500
999			_c199141 _d199141
003			OSt
005			20200226101946.0
008			191202s20182014xxubr|||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aTan, Hun-Tong _9176354
245	1	0	_aManagement´s responsibility acceptance, locus of breach, and investors' reactions to internal control reports _cHung-Tong Tan & Yao Yu
300			_aPáginas 331 a la 355
520	3		_aThe triangle model of responsibility (Schlenker, Britt, Pennington, Murphy, and Doherty 1994) predicts that the extent that investors hold management responsible for an adverse event is jointly determined by the links among three elements—management, the adverse event, and the relevant accounting regulations/standards or public norms. Applying this theory, we conduct experiments to examine how the locus of breach (external versus internal) moderates the efficacy of management's responsibility acceptance (higher versus lower). Our results show that management's higher (versus lower) responsibility acceptance is a more effective strategy in the presence of an external breach, but not in the presence of an internal breach (Experiment 1). Follow-up experiments suggest that this result is driven by the relative strength of the triangle links underlying the external versus internal breaches, rather than the locus per se.
650	1	4	_aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176355
650	2	4	_aComportamiento financiero _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176356
650	2	4	_aReportes financieros _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176357
650	2	4	_aControl interno _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176358
700	1		_aYu, Yao _9176359
773	0		_082265 _9380262 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.6 (Nov) _o0000002032749 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h24 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART