000			01922nab a2200229 a 4500
999			_c199153 _d199153
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008			191203s20182016xxubr ||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aBalsam, Steven _9176411
245	1	0	_aCreditor influence and CEO compensation _bevidence from debt covenant violations _cSteven Balsam, Yuqi Gu & Connie X. Mao
300			_aPáginas 23 a la 50
520	3		_aDebt covenant violation alters firm dynamics, providing creditors with the right to demand repayment, and via that right, influence firm actions. We provide evidence consistent with creditors employing that channel to influence CEO compensation. Using regression discontinuity analysis, we show that in the year after a covenant violation, after controlling for other factors, CEO compensation is 8.5 percent lower and the CEO's compensation package contains fewer risk-taking incentives, as the vega associated with newly granted options is 26 percent lower. These changes are more pronounced when the creditor has greater influence, such as when the borrower and creditor have a prior lending relationship, the creditor is a highly reputable bank, or when the borrower is financially weaker. We also find that CEOs' risk-taking incentives decrease with the number of debt covenants; in particular, the number of performance debt covenants being breached.
650	1	4	_aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176412
650	2	4	_9176351 _aInstituciones financieras _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aGobierno corporativo _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176413
650	2	4	_aConvenios de pagos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176414
700	1		_aGu, Yuqi _9176415
700	1		_aMao, Connie X. _9176416
773	0		_082265 _9380103 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.5 (Sep) _o0000002033002 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h27 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras y referencias bibliográficas
942			_2ddc _cART