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040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aWilliams, Branden M. _9176513
245	1	0	_aMultinational tax incentives and offshored U.S. jobs _cBranden M. Williams
300			_aPáginas 293 la 324
520	3		_aThis paper examines if, when, and to what extent multinational tax incentives incrementally explain where firms move offshored U.S. jobs. Using jobs data from a Department of Labor program called Trade Adjustment Assistance, I find a significant association between tax incentives and both the likelihood that a foreign country hosts offshored U.S. jobs and the number of U.S. jobs it hosts. This association is stronger when managers have discretion to coordinate cross-border transactions internally and when they do not face political costs imposed by labor unions. Following instances of offshoring, I find some evidence that offshoring firms have lower effective tax rates, but these reductions are concentrated within larger layoffs in which jobs are sent to low-tax countries. These findings are relevant to understanding the real effects and welfare consequences of incentives created by current U.S. tax policy.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aImpuestos _xLegislación _zEstados Unidos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176514
650	2	4	_aEmpresas costa afuera _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176515
650	2	4	_aCreación de empleo _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176516
773	0		_082265 _9380103 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.5 (Sep) _o0000002033002 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h32 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART