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040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aYost, Benjamin P. _9176517
245	1	0	_aLocked-in _bthe effect of CEOs' capital gains taxes on corporate risk-taking _cBenjamin P. Yost
300			_aPáginas 325 a la 358
520	3		_aI study the effects of CEOs’ unrealized capital gains tax liabilities (tax burdens) on corporate risk-taking. Recent work suggests that high tax burdens discourage CEOs from selling stock. I hypothesize that this causes the executives to become overexposed to firm-specific risk, thereby reducing their willingness to make risky corporate decisions. In a series of tests, I find that corporate risk-taking decreases as CEOs’ personal tax burdens increase. Further, firms with CEOs who are more locked-in to their stock positions (i.e., CEOs with higher tax burdens) experience larger increases in risk-taking following federal and state tax cuts. When I investigate the mechanism behind this relation, I find that tax cuts trigger stock sales by the locked-in executives, allowing for improved diversification. Overall, my findings indicate that the personal tax burdens of CEOs affect the firm by reducing executives’ preferences for risk at the corporate level.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_962505 _aRiesgo (Finanzas) _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aAdministración de incentivos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176518
773	0		_082265 _9380103 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.5 (Sep) _o0000002033002 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h34 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART