000			01939nab a2200241 a 4500
999			_c199219 _d199219
003			OSt
005			20200226101956.0
008			191205s20172014xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aChen, Donghua _9176739
245	1	0	_aChina's closed pyramidal managerial labor market and the stock price crash risk _cDonghua Chen, Jeong-Bon Kim, Oliver Zhen Li & Shangkun Liang
300			_aPáginas 105 a la 131
520	3		_aManagers of China's state-owned firms work in a closed pyramidal managerial labor market. They enjoy non-transferable benefits if they choose to stay within this system. The higher up are they in this labor market hierarchy (their political ranks), the fewer are their outside employment opportunities. Due to career and wealth concerns, they are cautious and risk-averse when managing firms. We examine the effect of managers' political ranks on firms' stock price crash risk and find a negative association. This association mainly exists in firms with younger managers and managers with shorter tenure. Further, this effect is only significant in regions with weak market forces, in firms without foreign investors, without political connections, and during periods with no local government leaders' or managers' political promotions. We conclude that the political ranking system reduces the stock price crash risk.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aCompañías _xFinanzas _zChina _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176740
650	2	4	_aMercado laboral _zChina _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176741
650	2	4	_aAcciones (Bolsa) _xPrecios _zChina _9176745
700	1		_aKim, Jeong-Bon _9176742
700	1		_aZhen Li, Oliver _9176743
700	1		_aLiang, Shangkun _9176744
773	0		_082265 _9378922 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.3 (Jul) _o0000002033702 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h27 páginas _nIncluye tablas y referencias bibliográficas
942			_2ddc _cART