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999			_c199221 _d199221
003			OSt
005			20200226101956.0
008			191205s20172014xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aCorona, Carlos _9176746
245	1	4	_aThe value of confession _badmiting mistakes to build reputation _cCarlos Corona & Ramandeep S. Randhawa
300			_aPáginas 133 a la 161
520	3		_aOften, firms reveal oversights and bad decisions publicly through their financial reporting (for instance, restating earnings, impairing goodwill, etc.). These “confessions,” which usually lead to immediate reputation losses, may be attributed to attempts to be perceived as transparent or to attempts to avoid likely litigation costs. In this paper, however, we argue that reputational concerns about perceived ability alone can provide firms with strong enough incentives to confess their mistakes, even in the absence of other non-reputational disciplinary mechanisms. Analyzing the repeated interaction between a firm and an external evaluator who may detect the firm's mistakes, we show that, in equilibrium, a confession places the firm under higher future scrutiny, which is more costly for lower-quality firms. Consequently, in equilibrium, higher-quality firms confess mistakes more often.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aEmpresas _xOpinión pública _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176747
650	2	4	_aAuditoría _xModelos matemáticos _9176748
690			_aEquilibrio bayesiano perfecto _9176749
700	1		_aRandhawa, Ramandeep, S. _9176750
773	0		_082265 _9378922 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.3 (Jul) _o0000002033702 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h29 páginas _nIncluye figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART