000			02061nab a2200229 a 4500
999			_c199248 _d199248
003			OSt
005			20200226101959.0
008			191207s20172015xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aKross, Peter _9176842
245	1	0	_aVoluntary clawback adoption and the use of financial measures in CFO bonus plans _cPeter Kross, Mario Schabus & Frank Verbeeten
300			_aPáginas 213 a la 235
520	3		_aFirms trade-off CFOs’ fiduciary duties against their decision-making duties when designing CFO bonus plans. Decreasing bonus incentives tied to financial measures benefits CFOs’ fiduciary responsibilities at the expense of motivating their decision making duties. As prior research indicates that clawbacks increase personal misreporting costs through the loss of previously awarded compensation, we examine whether clawbacks allow firms to increase incentives in CFO bonus contracts. Based on a sample of U.S. firms between 2007 and 2013, we find that clawbacks are associated with greater CFO bonus incentives. We also find the increase in incentives to be more pronounced for CFOs relative to other executives. Our results are moderated by firms’ susceptibility to misreporting. The relation between clawbacks and incentives is weaker when firms experienced internal control deficiencies, have larger abnormal accruals, when CFOs are more vulnerable to pressure from CEOs, and when audit committees have less financial expertise and prestige.
650	1	4	_aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176843
650	2	4	_aCompensaciones a los trabajadores _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176844
650	2	4	_aAdministración de incentivos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176518
650	2	4	_aAdministración de personal _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176675
700	1		_aSchabus, Mario _9176845
700	1		_aVerbeeten, Frank _9176846
773	0		_082265 _9378922 _a The accounting review 2018 V.93 No.3 (Jul) _o0000002033702 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h23 páginas _nIncluye tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART