000			01867nab a2200217 a 4500
999			_c199256 _d199256
003			OSt
005			20200226102000.0
008			191207s20172015xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aBaginski, Stephen P. _9176879
245	2	0	_aDo career concerns affect the delay of bad news disclosure? _cStephen P. Baginski, John L. Campbell, Lisa A. Hinson & David S. Koo
300			_aPáginas 61 a la 95
520	3		_aTheory argues that career concerns (i.e., concerns about the impact of current performance on contemporaneous and future compensation) encourage managers to withhold bad news disclosure. However, empirical evidence regarding the extent to which a manager’s career concerns are associated with a delay in bad news disclosure is limited. Across multiple proxies for career concerns, we find that the extent to which managers delay bad news is positively associated with their level of career concerns. Then, we hand-collect data on a compensation contract that firms use to reduce CEOs’ career concerns (i.e., ex-ante severance pay agreements). We find that if managers receive a sufficiently large payment in the event of dismissal, they no longer delay the disclosure of bad news. Overall, our findings support prior theoretical evidence that managers delay bad news disclosure due to career concerns and suggest a mechanism through which firms can mitigate the delay.
650	1	4	_aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176880
650	2	4	_aAdministración de personal _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176675
700	1		_aCampbell, John L. _9176881
700	1		_aHinson, Lisa A. _9175893
700	1		_aKoo, David S. _9176674
773	0		_082265 _9378307 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.2 (Mar) _o0000002033447 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h35 páginas _nIncluye figuras, tablas y referencias bibliográficas
942			_2ddc _cART