000			02108nab a2200229 a 4500
999			_c199270 _d199270
003			OSt
005			20200226102002.0
008			191209s20172014xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aVan Peteghem, Mathijs _9176980
245	1	0	_aBeyond diversity _ba tale of faultlines and frictions in the board of directors _cMathijs Van Peteghem, Liesbeth Bruynseels & Ann Gaeremynck
300			_aPáginas 339 a la 367
520	3		_aVarious regulatory governance initiatives have strived for board diversity, as diversity stimulates creativity, encourages discussion, and enlarges the board's knowledge base. However, increased diversity results in superior decision-making only when the board is free from conflicts and acts as a cohesive group. In this paper, we extend existing corporate governance research by introducing faultline theory to the board of directors (Lau and Murnighan 1998). The idea is to show how a board's diversity structure can give rise to the formation of subgroups along faultlines. The resulting subgroup formation may, in turn, reduce board effectiveness. Using a sample of U.S.- listed firms between 2008 and 2012, results suggest that boards with strong faultlines are associated with lower firm performance, lower CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, and higher abnormal CEO compensation. Understanding potential unintended consequences of board diversity could be of interest to regulators and companies that plan to appoint new directors to the board.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_9176908 _aDirectores de compañías _xToma de decisiones _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_9176413 _aGobierno corporativo _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_9176853 _aFinanzas corporativas _xLegislación _vPublicaciones seriadas
700	1		_aBruynseels, Liesbeth _9176981
700	1		_aGaeremynck, Ann _9176982
773	0		_082265 _9378307 _aThe accounting review 2018 V.93 No.2 (Mar) _o0000002033447 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h29 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART