000			01687nab a2200217 a 4500
999			_c199428 _d199428
003			OSt
005			20200226102027.0
008			191217s20162015xxu||||| |||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aKhan, Mozaffar _9177720
245	1	0	_aInstitutional ownership and corporate tax avoidance _bnew evidence _cMozaffar Khan, Suraj Srinivasan & Liang Tan
300			_aPáginas 101 a la 122
520	3		_aWe provide new evidence on the agency theory of corporate tax avoidance (Slemrod 2004; Crocker and Slemrod 2005; Chen and Chu 2005) by showing that increases in institutional ownership are associated with increases in tax avoidance. Using the Russell index reconstitution setting to isolate exogenous shocks to institutional ownership, and a regression discontinuity design that facilitates sharper identification of treatment effects, we find a significant and discontinuous increase in tax avoidance following Russell 2000 inclusion. The tax avoidance involves the use of tax shelters, and immediate benefits include higher profit margins and likelihood of meeting or beating analyst expectations. Collectively, the results shed light on the effect of increased ownership concentration on tax avoidance.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aEvasión de impuestos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9177721
690			_aPropiedad institucional _9177722
700	1		_aSrinivasan, Suraj _9177723
700	1		_aTan, Liang _9177724
773	0		_082265 _9377626 _aThe accounting review 2017 V.92 No.2 (Mar) _o0000002032282 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h22 páginas _nIncluye figuras, tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART