000			01801nab a2200217 4500
999			_c199634 _d199634
003			OSt
005			20200226102049.0
008			200127s2016 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aDechow, Patricia M. _9178299
245	1		_aSEC comment letters and insider sales _cPatricia M. Dechow, Alastair Lawrence & James P. Ryans
300			_aPáginas 401 a la 439
520	3		_aWe document that insider trading is significantly higher than normal levels prior to the public disclosure of SEC comment letters relating to revenue recognition. Furthermore, insider trading is triple its normal level for firms with high short positions. We find a small negative return at the comment letter release date and a negative drift in returns of 1 to 5 percent over the next 50 days following the release. We also find that greater pre-disclosure sales are associated with a stronger negative drift. This evidence suggests that insiders appear to benefit from trading prior to revenue recognition comment letters. We investigate whether the delayed price reaction to comment letter releases is due to investor inattention. Consistent with this explanation, we document that comment letters are downloaded infrequently from EDGAR in the days following their public disclosure.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aAuditoría _xLegislación _zEstados Unidos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9177057
690			_aSecurities and Exchange Commission (SEC) _9178287
700	1		_aLawrence, Alastair _9177676
700	1		_aRyans, James P. _9177677
773	0		_082265 _9382158 _aThe accounting review 2016 V.91 No. 2 (Mar) _o0000002031463 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h39 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART