000			01822nab a2200193 4500
999			_c199638 _d199638
003			OSt
005			20200226102050.0
008			200127s2016 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aHealy, Paul M. _9160376
245	1	0	_aAn analysis of firms' self-reported anticorruption efforts _cPul M. Healy & George Serafeim
300			_aPáginas 489 a la 511
520	3		_aWe use Transparency International's ratings of self-reported anticorruption efforts to analyze factors underlying the ratings. Our tests examine whether these disclosures reflect firms' real efforts to combat corruption or are cheap talk. We find that the ratings are related to enforcement and monitoring, country and industry corruption risk, and governance variables. Controlling for these effects and other ratings determinants, we find that firms with lower residual ratings have higher subsequent citations in corruption news events. They also report higher future sales growth and show a negative relation between profitability change and sales growth in high corruption geographic segments, but not in low corruption segments. The net effect on valuation from sales growth and changes in profitability is close to zero. The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests, including analysis of disclosures for a larger sample over multiple years. We conclude that, on average, firms' disclosures signal real efforts to combat corruption.
650	1	4	_aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178307
650	1	4	_aEmpresas _xCorrupción _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178308
700	1		_aSerafeim, George _9176270
773	0		_082265 _9382158 _aThe accounting review 2016 V.91 No. 2 (Mar) _o0000002031463 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h22 páginas _nIncluye tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART