000			01804nab a2200217 4500
999			_c199658 _d199658
003			OSt
005			20200226102052.0
008			200128s2016 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aDeFond, Mark L. _9177952
245	1	0	_aClient conservatism and auditor-client contracting _cMark L. DeFond, Chee Yeow Lim & Yoonseok Zang
300			_aPáginas 69 a la 98
520	3		_aWe find that auditors of more conservative clients charge lower fees, issue fewer going concern opinions, and resign less frequently, consistent with more conservative clients imposing less engagement risk on their auditors. Using path analysis, we find evidence that both inherent risk and auditor business risk explain these associations. Also consistent with conservatism reducing auditor business risk, we find that client conservatism is associated with fewer lawsuits against auditors and with fewer client restatements. Taken together, our results are consistent with auditors viewing client conservatism as an important determinant of engagement risk that, in turn, affects auditor-client contracting decisions. Our findings should be of interest to auditors who actively manage client risk and to standard-setters who recently dropped conservatism as a desired attribute of financial reporting quality.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_991050 _aAuditoría _xTarifas _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_9176449 _aConservadurismo contable _vPublicaciones seriadas
700	1		_aYeow Lim, Chee _9177854
700	1		_aZang, Yoonseok _9178441
773	0		_082265 _9372813 _aThe accounting review 2016 V.91 No. 1 (Jan) _o0000002030250 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h20 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART