000			02070nab a2200217 4500
999			_c199660 _d199660
003			OSt
005			20200226102053.0
008			200129s2016 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aFeltham, Gerald A. _9178462
245	1	0	_aPerformance aggregation and descentralized contracting _cGerald A. Feltham, Christian Hofmann & Raffi J. Indjejikian
300			_aPáginas 99 a la 117
520	3		_aWe examine how accounting practices that aggregate or disaggregate the contributions of different economic agents influence the choice of organizational form. We consider a principal/multi-agent model where the principal either contracts with all parties directly or delegates part of the contracting authority to one of the agents. Delegated contracts improve risk sharing and generate implicit incentives for the agent entrusted with contracting authority. However, delegated contracts also entail a loss of control in motivating lower-level agents. In addition, when performance is aggregated, delegated contracts render agents' incentives more interdependent and create spillovers up and down the hierarchy. We demonstrate that accounting practices that aggregate the performance of multiple agents can complement organizational forms characterized by greater decentralization. In contrast, accounting practices that capture agents' performance contributions separately favor more centralized organizational forms. Our findings suggest that in settings where performance measurement systems are more aggregate, decentralization is more prevalent.
650	1	4	_aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178463
650	2	4	_977782 _aPlanificación estratégica _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_9176675 _aAdministración de personal _vPublicaciones seriadas
700	1		_aHofmann, Christian _9178464
700	1		_aIndjejikian, Raffi J. _9178465
773	0		_082265 _9372813 _aThe accounting review 2016 V.91 No. 1 (Jan) _o0000002030250 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h19 páginas _nIncluye referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART