000			02075nab a2200229 4500
999			_c199663 _d199663
003			OSt
005			20200226102053.0
008			200129s2016 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aKlassen, Kenneth J. _9177645
245	1	4	_aThe role of auditors, non-auditors, and internal tax departments in corporate tax aggressiveness _cKenneth J. Klassen, Petro Lisowsky & Devan Mescall
300			_aPáginas 179 a la 205
520	3		_aUsing confidential data from the Internal Revenue Service on who signs a corporation’s tax return, we investigate whether the party primarily responsible for the tax compliance function of the firm — the auditor, an external non-auditor, or the internal tax department — is related to the corporation’s tax aggressiveness. We report three key findings: (1) firms preparing their own tax returns or hiring a non-auditor claim more aggressive tax positions than firms using their auditor as the tax preparer; (2) auditor-provided tax services are related to tax aggressiveness even after considering tax preparer identity, which supports and extends prior research using tax fees as a proxy for tax planning; and (3) Big Four tax preparers in particular are linked to less tax aggressiveness when they are the auditor than when they are not the auditor. Our findings help policymakers and researchers better understand an important feature of tax compliance intermediaries, particularly how the dual role via audits is related to observable corporate tax outcomes.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aImpuestos _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178472
650	2	4	_9177445 _aAuditores _vPublicaciones seriadas _xResponsabilidad profesional
650	2	4	_991050 _aAuditoría _vPublicaciones seriadas
700	1		_aLisowsky, Petro _9176754
700	1		_aMescall, Devan _9178473
773	0		_082265 _9372813 _aThe accounting review 2016 V.91 No. 1 (Jan) _o0000002030250 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h27 páginas _nIncluye tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART