000 02214nab a2200205 a 4500
999 _c199700
_d199700
003 OSt
005 20200226102058.0
008 200203s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040 _aCO-BoUGC
_cCO-BoUGC
100 1 _aPyzoha, Jonathan
_9178700
245 1 0 _aWhy does restatements decrease in a clawback environment?
_bAn investigation into financial reporting executives' decision-making during the restatement process
_cJonathan S. Pyzoha
300 _aPáginas 2515 a la 2536
520 3 _aPrior archival studies find that firms that voluntarily adopted clawback policies have experienced a reduction in restatements. I experimentally examine this outcome by investigating the influence of two key factors (i.e., executive compensation structure and auditor quality) on financial reporting executives' (hereafter, “executives”) decision-making regarding a proposed restatement that will lead to a clawback of their incentives. I find that executives (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) facing a lower quality auditor are less likely to agree with amending prior financial statements when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based. However, this tendency is reduced when executives face a higher quality auditor, indicating that higher quality auditors can act as effective monitors. My results identify an ex post unintended consequence of clawback regulation that could at least partially offset the benefits of the ex ante deterrent effects of clawbacks, and that could contribute to findings of less frequent restatements when clawback policies are in place. I discuss potential implications regarding the role of executives during restatement decisions and auditors' risk assessments in a clawback environment.
650 1 4 _991036
_aContabilidad
_vPublicaciones seriadas
650 2 4 _aEmpresas
_xContratos y especificaciones
_vPublicaciones seriadas
_zEstados Unidos
_9178701
650 2 4 _aEjecutivos
_xToma de decisiones
_vPublicaciones seriadas
_9178702
690 _aDodd-Frank Act
_9178703
773 0 _082265
_9370852
_aThe accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 6 (Nov)
_o0000002031098
_x0001-4826 (papel)
_h22 páginas
_nIncluye tablas, figuras y referencias bibliográficas
942 _2ddc
_cART