000 | 02214nab a2200205 a 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
999 |
_c199700 _d199700 |
||
003 | OSt | ||
005 | 20200226102058.0 | ||
008 | 200203s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d | ||
040 |
_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC |
||
100 | 1 |
_aPyzoha, Jonathan _9178700 |
|
245 | 1 | 0 |
_aWhy does restatements decrease in a clawback environment? _bAn investigation into financial reporting executives' decision-making during the restatement process _cJonathan S. Pyzoha |
300 | _aPáginas 2515 a la 2536 | ||
520 | 3 | _aPrior archival studies find that firms that voluntarily adopted clawback policies have experienced a reduction in restatements. I experimentally examine this outcome by investigating the influence of two key factors (i.e., executive compensation structure and auditor quality) on financial reporting executives' (hereafter, “executives”) decision-making regarding a proposed restatement that will lead to a clawback of their incentives. I find that executives (i.e., CFOs, controllers, and treasurers) facing a lower quality auditor are less likely to agree with amending prior financial statements when a higher proportion of their pay is incentive-based. However, this tendency is reduced when executives face a higher quality auditor, indicating that higher quality auditors can act as effective monitors. My results identify an ex post unintended consequence of clawback regulation that could at least partially offset the benefits of the ex ante deterrent effects of clawbacks, and that could contribute to findings of less frequent restatements when clawback policies are in place. I discuss potential implications regarding the role of executives during restatement decisions and auditors' risk assessments in a clawback environment. | |
650 | 1 | 4 |
_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas |
650 | 2 | 4 |
_aEmpresas _xContratos y especificaciones _vPublicaciones seriadas _zEstados Unidos _9178701 |
650 | 2 | 4 |
_aEjecutivos _xToma de decisiones _vPublicaciones seriadas _9178702 |
690 |
_aDodd-Frank Act _9178703 |
||
773 | 0 |
_082265 _9370852 _aThe accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 6 (Nov) _o0000002031098 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h22 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras y referencias bibliográficas |
|
942 |
_2ddc _cART |