000			01899nab a2200229 a 4500
999			_c199729 _d199729
003			OSt
005			20200226102100.0
008			200206s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aChen, Xia _9179043
245	1	0	_aCEO contractual protection and managerial short-termism _cXia Cheng, Quiang Cheng, Alvis K. Lo & Xin Wang
300			_aPáginas 1871 a la 1906
520	3		_aHow to address managerial short-termism is an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. We examine the effect of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms with CEO contractual protection are less likely to cut R&D expenditures to avoid earnings decreases and are less likely to engage in real earnings management. The effect of CEO contractual protection is both statistically and economically significant. We further find that this effect increases with the duration and monetary strength of CEO contractual protection. The cross-sectional analyses indicate that the effect is stronger for firms in more homogeneous industries and for firms with higher transient institutional ownership, as protection is particularly important for CEOs in these firms, and is stronger when there are weaker alternative monitoring mechanisms.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aEjecutivos _xSalarios, pensiones, etc. _vPublicaciones seriadas _9179044
650	2	4	_aEjecutivos _xContratos de trabajo _vPublicaciones seriadas _9179045
700	1		_aCheng, Quian _9176017
700	1		_aLo, Alvis K. _9179046
700	1		_aWang, Xin _9177021
773	0		_082265 _9369792 _aThe accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 5 (Sep) _o0000002029959 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h36 páginas _nIncluye figuras, tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART