000			02110nab a2200217 a 4500
999			_c199732 _d199732
003			OSt
005			20200226102100.0
008			200206s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aCallaway Dee, Carol _9179056
245	1		_aWho did the audit? _baudit quality and disclosures of other audit participants in PCAOB filings _cCarol Callaway Dee, Ayalew Lulseged & Tianming Zhang
300			_aPáginas 1939 a la 1967
520	3		_aWe empirically test whether audit quality is affected when part of an SEC issuer's audit is outsourced to auditors other than the principal auditor (“participating auditors”). We find a significantly negative market reaction and a significant decline in earnings response coefficients (ERCs) for experimental issuers disclosed for the first time as having participating auditors involved in their audits. However, we find no market reaction and no decline in ERCs for a matching sample of issuers that are not disclosed as using participating auditors, nor for issuers disclosed for the second or third time as using participating auditors. We also find actual audit quality as measured by absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals is lower for the experimental issuers, although we find no difference in audit fees paid by the experimental and matching issuers in a multivariate model. Our findings suggest that the PCAOB's proposed rule requiring disclosure of the use of other auditors in addition to the principal auditor would provide information useful to investors in assessing audit quality for SEC issuers.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aAuditoría _zEstados Unidos _xLegislación _vPublicaciones seriadas _9179057
690			_aThe Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) _9177452
700	1		_aLulseged, Ayalew _9179058
700	1		_aZhang, Tianming _9179059
773	0		_082265 _9369792 _aThe accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 5 (Sep) _o0000002029959 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h29 páginas _nIncluye tablas, referencias bibliográficas y apéndices
942			_2ddc _cART