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008			200210s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aAbernethy, Margaret A. _9179244
245	1	4	_aThe influence of CEO power on compensation contract design _cMargaret A. Abernethy, Yu Flora Kuang & Bo Qin
300			_aPáginas 1265 a la 1306
520	3		_aWe investigate if CEO power influences a firm’s decision to change its compensation system in response to regulatory and public pressure. In particular, we assess if CEO power influences the choice of performance measures as a form of camouflage to minimize the impact of these reforms on their wealth. We examine one component of CEO pay, namely the use of performance-vested stock option (PVSO) plans, and find that firms with powerful CEOs attach less challenging targets in the initial PVSOs granted to their CEOs. Such firms also appear to adopt PVSO plans early and are more likely to do so when faced with public outrage over executive compensation. Our results suggest that powerful CEOs attempt to appease public outrage by quickly adopting PVSOs, but adopting PVSOs early does not appear to be an optimal strategy for increasing shareholder value. Regulators intended that implementation of PVSOs would be beneficial to shareholders by improving the link between CEO pay and firm performance. However, our results indicate powerful CEOs can negate some of the beneficial effect of PVSOs through their influence on adoption and choice of performance targets.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_9177004 _aDirectores de compañías _vPublicaciones seriadas _xToma de decisiones
650	2	4	_9177024 _aDirectores de compañías _vPublicaciones seriadas _xSueldos, pensiones, etc.
700	1		_aKuang, Yu Flora _9179245
700	1		_aQion, Bo _9179246
773	0		_082265 _9368138 _aThe accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 4 (Jul) _o0000002030740 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h42 páginas _pIncluye tablas y referencias bibliográficas
942			_2ddc _cART