000			01991nab a2200217 a 4500
999			_c199771 _d199771
003			OSt
005			20200226102104.0
008			200210s2015 xxu|||||r|||| 00| 0 eng d
040			_aCO-BoUGC _cCO-BoUGC
100	1		_aHales, Jeffrey _9176581
245	1	0	_aSelection benefits of stock-based compensation for the rank-and-file _cJeffrey Hales, Laura W. Wang & Michael G. Williamson
300			_aPáginas 1497 a la 1516
520	3		_aWe investigate a potential selection benefit of stock-based compensation for rank-and-file employees, whose pay under this compensation form is insensitive to their individual efforts. We use a laboratory experiment to demonstrate that individuals with higher levels of dispositional optimism are more likely to choose compensation that is contingent on a company's future stock price than to choose fixed pay, even after controlling for the individual's risk preferences. Furthermore, compared to participants selecting fixed pay, those selecting stock-based compensation also perform better on a challenging problem-solving task, a result that we show is due to their higher levels of dispositional optimism. Collectively, we demonstrate that stock-based compensation can have productivity-enhancing effects, even if stock prices are completely insensitive to individual efforts. In doing so, we provide a partial explanation for the puzzling prevalence of stock-based compensation plans at the rank-and-file level and contribute to the broader contract-selection literature.
650	1	4	_991036 _aContabilidad _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_9124518 _aAcciones (Bolsa) _vPublicaciones seriadas
650	2	4	_aMotivación del empleado _vPublicaciones seriadas _9176028
700	1		_aWang, Laura W. _9179263
700	1		_aWilliamson, Michael G. _9176995
773	0		_082265 _9368138 _aThe accounting review 2015 V.90 No. 4 (Jul) _o0000002030740 _x0001-4826 (papel) _h20 páginas _nIncluye tablas, figuras y referencias bibliográficas
942			_2ddc _cART