Executive equity risk-taking incentives and audit pricing Yangyang Chen, Ferdinand A. Gul, Madhu Veeraraghavan & Leon Zolotoy
Tipo de material:
ArtículoDescripción: Páginas 2205 a la 2234Tema(s): - Contabilidad -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Auditoría -- (2002 - 2010) -- Estados Unidos -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Empresas -- (2002 - 2010) -- Estados Unidos -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Directores de empresas -- Sobresueldos -- (2002 - 2010) -- Estados Unidos -- Publicaciones seriadas
- Riesgo (Finanzas) -- (2002 - 2010) -- Estados Unidos -- Publicaciones seriadas
| Tipo de ítem | Biblioteca actual | Colección | Signatura topográfica | Info Vol | Copia número | Estado | Fecha de vencimiento | Código de barras | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revistas | Central Bogotá Sala Hemeroteca | Colección Hemeroteca | 657 (Navegar estantería(Abre debajo)) | 2015 V.90 No.6 (Nov) | 1 | Disponible | 0000002031098 |
Using a large sample of U.S. firms spanning the period 2000-2010, we document a strong positive association between the sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio to stock return volatility (vega) and audit fees. We also show that the positive association between vega and audit fees is weaker in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period. In supplementary tests, we show that the relation between vega and audit fees is stronger for firms with older CEOs and in firms where the CEO is also chairman of the board. Collectively, our results suggest that audit firms incorporate executive risktaking incentives in the fees they charge for their services.